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SPACE-BASED FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH AND THE 
ITAR:A STUDY IN VAGUENESS, OVERBREADTH, AND 
PRIOR RESTRAINT 
 
Rachel Lehmer Claus, Esq.* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
“Fundamental research” is openly conducted science and 
engineering research carried out at institutions of higher education in the 
United States.1  Faculty, students, collaborators and other researchers in 
these institutions engage in the free, constant, and lively exchange of ideas 
with their peers in the U.S. and abroad. This freedom of speech and 
association, and the openness that attends it, are fundamental to our 
culture and vital to the success of our research universities. Many of the 
extraordinary advances in science and technology of the last few decades 
derived from and flourished in the atmosphere of open communication 
that is a hallmark of academic scientific communities.2 
                                                 
* Ms. Claus is University Counsel for the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center (SLAC), 
Stanford University; however, the opinions expressed in this paper are hers alone and do 
not necessarily reflect the view of Stanford University or its Linear Accelerator Center. 
Ms. Claus gratefully acknowledges the technical assistance of Azita Saghafi, second year 
student at the Santa Clara University School of Law, in bringing this article to 
publication.  
1 “‘Fundamental research’ is defined as basic and applied research in science and 
engineering, the results of which ordinarily are published and shared broadly within the 
scientific community, …” National Policy on the Transfer of Scientific, Technical, and 
Engineering Information, National Security Decision Directive 189 (Sept. 21, 1998) 
[hereinafter National Security Decision Directive 189] available at 
http://www.aau.edu/research/ITAR-NSDD189.html. For purposes of this discussion, the 
term “basic” refers to experimental or theoretical work, undertaken primarily to acquire 
new knowledge and to develop related concepts and principles, without anticipating any 
particular use; the term “applied” refers similar original research that will result in new 
knowledge, but directed primarily toward a specific practical objective. ORGANISATION 
FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., FRASCATI MANUAL 2002: PROPOSED STANDARD 
PRACTICE FOR SURVEYS ON RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTAL DEVELOPMENT, at 30 
(2002). 
2 Maintaining this fruitful environment is of sufficient import to have prompted a number 
of universities to develop formal policies that preclude the acceptance of restrictions on 
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In fact, it is a signal mark of fundamental research that it is carried 
out in the public domain. During the mid-1980s, at the height of the Cold 
War, President Ronald Reagan issued a formal policy3 to give primacy to 
the importance our nation attaches to such openly conducted research. 
That policy defined “fundamental research” as the conduct of basic and 
applied research in science and engineering, the results of which are made 
available to the interested scientific community. It also established that 
fundamental research, unclassified and nonproprietary, conducted by U.S. 
academies is a proper subject of international scientific exchanges not 
subject to the restrictions of the International Traffic in Arms Regulation. 
Ultimately many of the advances derived from fundamental 
research and unclassified technologies have benefited the U.S. military as 
well as invigorated our economy. Science and technology are deemed 
elements critical to economic vigor.4 That said, those dedicated to national 
security rightly must be vigilant to ensure that vital defense technologies 
are not lost to those who would use them against us. Disclosure and access 
restrictions on particular types of research, through classification5 and 
                                                                                                                         
the conduct and dissemination of their research. Many decline research if the sponsor 
thereof is able to restrict dissemination or to deny to any otherwise eligible researcher or 
student the ability to participate in or access the intellectually significant portions of a 
research project. See Stanford University, Research Policy Handbook: Openness in 
Research, at http://www.stanford.edu/dept/DoR/rph/2-6.html (last modified Feb. 15, 
2001). This type of policy effectively eliminates proprietary, classified, or other secret 
research from the endeavors undertaken by fundamental research universities. As an aid 
to such institutions, the Council on Governmental Relations of the Association of 
American Universities maintains a website (with MIT) listing the types of restrictive 
clauses to be avoided in research contracts, see http://mit.edu/osp/www (last visited Jun. 
8, 2004). 
3 National Security Decision Directive 189, supra note 1. 
4 National Science Board, Science and Engineering Indicators-2002, 1 SCI. AND ENG’G 
INDICATORS-2002 (2002). 
5 Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825 (Apr. 20, 1995) (describing the general 
classification policy of the federal government), available at 
http://www.epic.org/open_gov/eo_12958.html (n.d.). Section 1.7(b) provides that basic 
scientific research information not clearly related to the national security may not be 
classified. However, Exec. Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315 (Mar. 25, 2003), 
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other official forms of secrecy, have been effectively used to protect 
against that threat. Inevitably, however, some tension exists between the 
national security establishment and the open academies upon which they 
draw.6 For the most part, U.S. universities have found methods to manage 
such conflicts. For example, as noted, some confront the dilemma by 
declining to undertake classified or secret research. Others establish 
separate entities to undertake “black box” research; the Lincoln 
Laboratory operated by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology is an 
example of this sequestering. 
Recent events, however, have caused a dramatic increase in the 
tension between the two important national priorities of security and open 
academies with regard to university fundamental research that is space-
based, satellite-reliant, or spacecraft related. Although space has been 
utilized as a research platform by universities for decades, and even 
though universities have been major participants in fundamental research 
contributing to spacecraft research throughout this time, today the 
openness inherent in such university-based research gives rise to more 
direct conflict and heightened restrictions. In this newly enflamed arena, 
commentators are voicing concerns about the stifling of scientific 
innovation, which in turn, adversely impacts both economic health and 
                                                                                                                         
added a new clause to section 1.5 that permits classification of scientific, technological, 
or economic matters related to national security and defense against transnational 
bioterrorism. For a discussion on the topic of national security and classification, see 
ARVIN S. QUIST, SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION: PRINCIPLES FOR 
CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION at Ch. 5 (1993) available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/quist2/index.html. 
6 For excellent discussions demonstrating the long history of this tension, see, e.g., 
Ferguson, Scientific and Technological Expression: A Problem in First Amendment 
Theory, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 519 (1981), and Shinn, The First Amendment and 
the Export Laws: Free Speech on Scientific & Technical Matters, 58 GEO. L.J. 368 
(1990). 
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national security.7  An atmosphere of “secrecy and burdensome 
regulations” makes it difficult to recruit both domestic and foreign talent 
to science and technology research, even though foreign researchers have 
been and continue to be “critical to the vitality of American innovation.”8 
This sea-change came about in 1999 when Congress mandated that 
export licensing jurisdiction of all satellites and related equipment and 
services, irrespective of military utility, be transferred from the 
Department of Commerce (under the Export Administration Regulations, 
or EAR9) to the Department of State10 (under the International Traffic in 
Arms Regulation, or ITAR11). Consequently, information about research, 
experimental, and scientific satellites is currently being treated as ITAR-
controlled “technical data” despite the fact that much of the hardware and 
information about it has been in the public domain from 30 years 
(satellites) to 50 years (rocketry) and is not classified. Further, the ITAR 
itself states that information in the public domain is not subject to 
                                                 
7 See, e.g., Alice P. Gast, Massachusetts Inst. of Tech., The Impact of Restricting 
Information Access on Science and Technology, at http://www.aau.edu/research/Gast.pdf 
(2003); ASHTON B. CARTER ET AL., KEEPING THE EDGE: MANAGING DEFENSE FOR THE 
FUTURE (2000); The Henry L. Stimson Center and Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, Study Group on Enhancing Multilateral Export Controls for US National 
Security: Final Report, at 
http://www.stimson.org/newpubs.cfm?PT=2&SB=0&P=0&StartRow=31 (Apr. 2001). 
8 Alice P. Gast, Massachusetts Inst. of Tech., The Impact of Restricting Information 
Access on Science and Technology 4-5, at http://www.aau.edu/research/Gast.pdf (2003). 
9 Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. § 2401 (2003 or 1979), implemented by the 
Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. §§ 730 -774.1, available at 
http://w3.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/indexccl.pdf (last modified May 6, 2004). [Note: the 
EAA expired on August 20, 2001, but the EAR is maintained in effect under the authority 
of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, Exec. Order 
No.13,222, 3 C.F.R. 13,222 (2002).] 
10 Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. 
No. 105-251, 112 Stat. 2267, 10 U.S.C. § 7420. 
11 The Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1979), Priv. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat 
503 (Sept. 29, 1979), 22 C.F.R. §§ 120 – 130 (2002), available at 
http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/cfr/waisidx_01/22cfr121_01.html (Apr. 1, 2001). 
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disclosure restrictions and access controls,12 a position recently reiterated 
by the State Department13 and also found in case law.14 
As a result, universities operating in the public domain and 
carrying out unclassified spacebased research in various disciplines 
(environmental studies, bio-molecular research, particle and astrophysics, 
cosmology) may find they are not allowed to involve foreign students, 
faculty, and collaborators unless they first obtain an export license15 from 
the State Department. Based on ITAR treatment of “associated 
equipment,” “related systems,” and “payloads,” similar licensing issues 
emerge with regard to such academic endeavors as aero- and astronautics, 
robotics, nanotechnology, mechanical and electrical engineering, optics, 
remote sensing devices, and computing and data acquisition systems. 
Universities undertake such study and research in the public domain, 
bringing to bear on these disciplines the world’s best minds and exposing 
their work to the stimulating rigors of peer review and intellectual 
competition. 
This paper will explore how the ITAR only minimally implements 
National Security Decision Directive 189 as it relates to spacecraft-related 
fundamental research16 and how it imposes licensing restrictions on the 
dissemination of information, falling within the realm of protected 
                                                 
12 22 C.F.R. § 120.3 (2004); 22 C.F.R. § 120.10(5) (2004); 22 C.F.R. § 120.11 (2004). 
13 67 Fed. Reg. 15,099-15,101 (March 29, 2002) (wherein the State Department stated 
that it was State Department policy to not regulate fundamental research, by definition, 
research that is in the public domain.). 
14 United States v.Posey, 864 F.2d 1487 (9th Cir. 1989). Dismissal was granted as to the 
cause of action relating to export of technical information available through the Freedom 
of Information Act, which the Defense Department considered in the public domain and 
thus exempt from export control. 
15 Obtaining such a license may be difficult and time-consuming, and the process, bereft 
of clear standards is unpredictable. Moreover, merely submitting to such a restriction may 
alter forever and adversely the character and treatment of the research (22 C.F.R. § 
120.11(8)(ii) provides that the acceptance of, among other things, dissemination 
restrictions precludes characterizing the research as “fundamental.”). 
16 See also John R. Liebman, Scientific Research and Technical Data Export Controls: 
When Two Worlds Collide, 11 INT’L L.J. ST. B. ASS’N CAL. NO. 2 (2001-2002). 
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speech.17 The restrictions may violate constitutional due process 
protections and constitutional safeguards against prior restraint.18 
 
I. NSDD 189, PUBLIC LAW 105-261, AND ITAR 
A. The POLICY 
In 1985, then President Ronald Wilson Reagan signed National 
Security Decision Directive 189, which was released by the National 
Security Council pursuant to Executive Order 12,356.19 This pivotal 
document establishes a national policy with regard to fundamental 
research. It reads as follows: 
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE 189 
NATIONAL POLICY ON THE TRANSFER OF SCIENTIFIC, 
TECHNICAL AND ENGINEERING INFORMATION 
 
I. PURPOSE 
This directive establishes national policy for controlling the 
flow of science, technology and engineering information 
produced in federally funded fundamental research at 
colleges, universities, and laboratories. Fundamental 
research is defined as follows: 
“Fundamental research” means basic and 
applied research in science and engineering, 
the results of which ordinarily are published 
and shared broadly within the scientific 
community, as distinguished from 
proprietary research and from industrial 
development, design, production, and 
                                                 
17 For an interesting discussion of scientific information as protected speech, see 
Bernstein v. Department of State, 945 F. Supp. 1279 (N.D. Cal. 1996) and Bernstein v. 
Department of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999), reh’g granted en banc and opinion 
withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 2000), in which the District Court and the Court of 
Appeals discuss public domain information, speech, and export controls. 
18 For an analysis of these issues from a private sector perspective, see Ronald J. Sievert, 
Has the Time Finally Arrived to Overhaul the U.S. Export Control Regime?, 37 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 89 (Winter 2002). 
19 Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 12,356 (1982), at 
http://www.epic.org/open_gov/eo_12356.html (Apr. 2, 1982). 
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product utilization, the results of which 
ordinarily are restricted for proprietary or 
national security reasons. 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
The acquisition of advanced technology from the United 
States by the Eastern Block nations for the purpose of 
enhancing their military capabilities poses a significant 
threat to our national security. Intelligence studies indicate 
a small but significant target of the Eastern Bloc 
intelligence gathering effort is science and engineering 
research performed at universities and federal laboratories. 
At the same time, our leadership position in science and 
technology is an essential element in our economic and 
physical security. The strength of American science 
requires a research environment conducive to creativity, an 




It is the policy of this Administration that, to the maximum 
extent possible, the products of fundamental research 
remain unrestricted. It is also the policy of this 
Administration that, where the national security requires 
control, the mechanism for control of information 
generated during federally funded fundamental research in 
science, technology and engineering at colleges, 
universities and laboratories is classification. Each federal 
government agency is responsible for: a) determining 
whether classification is appropriate prior to the award of a 
research grant, contract, or cooperative agreement and, if 
so, controlling the research results through standard 
classification procedures; b) periodically reviewing all 
research grants, contracts or cooperative agreements for 
potential classification. No restriction may be placed upon 
the conduct or reporting of federally funded fundament 
research that has not received national security 
classification, except as provided in applicable U.S. 
Statutes. 
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Executive Order 12,958, “Classified National Security 
Information”20 (17 April 1995) describes the general classification policy 
of the federal government.21  In section 1.7(b), it states that basic scientific 
research information not clearly related to the national security may not be 
classified. 
The policy enunciated in NSDD 18922 has been reaffirmed by 
every Administration since 1985, including the current one (George W. 
Bush). In a letter dated November 1, 2001, to Dr. Harold Brown, co-
chairman of the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), 
Condoleeza Rice, National Security Advisor to President George W. Bush, 
wrote: 
“The key to maintaining U.S. technological preeminence is 
to encourage open and collaborative basic research. The 
linkage between the free exchange of ideas and scientific 
innovation, prosperity, and U.S. national security is 
undeniable. This linkage is especially true as our armed 
forces depend less and less on internal research and 
development for the innovations they need to maintain the 
military superiority of the United States. In the context of 
broad-based review of our technology transfer controls that 
will begin this year, this Administration will review and 
update as appropriate the export control policies that affect 
basic research in the United States. In the interim, the 
policy on the transfer of scientific, technical, and 
engineering information set forth in NSDD-189 shall 
remain in effect, and we will ensure that this policy is 
followed.”23 [emphasis added] 
                                                 
20 Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,823, at 
http://www.epic.org/open_gov/eo_12958.html (Apr. 17, 1995). 
21 Interestingly, ITAR strictures, discussed infra, are often more stringent than would be 
required if the information or technology had been classified, due to ITAR’s 
vague,imprecise, and inconsistent requirements, generally interpreted by an 
administrative official untrained as to constitutionally protected speech. Unlike those 
operating within the ITAR regime, those operating in a classified environment, regulators 
and the regulated alike, know exactly how to proceed and what to expect. 
22 National Security Decision Directive 189, supra note 1. 
23 Condoleezza Rice Letter on NSDD-189, at 
http://www.aau.edu/research/Rice11.1.01.html (Nov. 1, 2001). 
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B. The LEGISLATION 
In the wake of the Cox Report24 and the allegations of spying at the 
Los Alamos National Laboratories, Congress legislatively reiterated the 
importance of the Missile Technology Control Regime: "[D]ue to the 
sensitivity of technologies involved, it is in the national security interests 
of the United States that United States satellites and related items be 
subject to the same export controls that apply...to munitions."25 That Act 
further stated that all satellites and related items that were on the 
Commerce Department dual-use list were to be transferred to State 
Department Munitions List and made subject to the International Traffic in 
Arms Regulation.26  Prior to the changes, the ITAR generally had 
jurisdiction over satellites of specific military design or capability. The 
1999 changes to the implementing regulations (the ITAR) expressly listed 
for the first time “experimental, scientific, and research” satellites, 
associated systems, and related equipment.27  Most of this technology and 
its related information had served a preponderantly civilian purpose for 
decades; information on how to build these types of satellites and rockets 
had been in the public domain for 30 and 50 years, respectively.28 
The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) authorizes the President to 
control the import and export of defense articles and defense services by 
                                                 
24 H.R. REP. NO. 105-851 (Jun. 14 1999), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house/hr105851-html/index.html (Jun. 14, 1999) and 
http://hillsource.house.gov/CoxReport/report/welcome2.html (1999). 
25 Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. 
No. 105-251, 112 Stat. 2267, 10 U.S.C. § 7420. 
26 Id. 
27 See also 15 C.F.R. § 774 Supp.1 n.4 [ECCN 9A004] (delegating licensing jurisdiction 
of satellites and their payload to the Office of Defense Trade Controls of the Department 
of State.). See http://www.pmdtc.org for more on treatment of “space qualified” items. 
28 Specifications and other technical information concerning fabrication of Delta-series 
rockets had been available on a publicly accessible website, having previously been 
approved for release by the Secretary of the Air Force. Those websites were recently 
dismantled, but you can get a flavor of what they once were by visiting 
http://antwrp.gsfc.nasa.gov/apod/ap951213.html and 
http://www.universetoday.com/html/topics/delta.html. 
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designating such items to the United States Munitions List (USML).29  
The USML resides in the ITAR at Part 120, and the expressly stated 
purpose of ITAR is to control export/import of defense articles and 
defense services.30  Furthermore, anything that is to be added to the USML 
must be designed or intended for military use (or activities intended to 
support military use) and not have a predominant civilian use or civilian 
performance equivalence.31  
 
C. The REGULATIONS 
The general rule is that a license or other approval must be 
obtained from the State Department in order to export a defense article or 
to provide a defense service.32  In parsing the ITAR for this discussion, I 
have emphasized in boldface any language of particular import to this 
discussion. 
“Export” means: 
    (1) Sending or taking a defense article out of the United 
States in any manner, except by mere travel outside of the 
United States by a person whose personal knowledge 
includes technical data; or 
    (2) Transferring registration, control or ownership to a 
foreign person of any aircraft, vessel, or satellite covered 
by the U.S. Munitions List, whether in the United States or 
abroad; or 
    (3) Disclosing (including oral or visual disclosure) or 
transferring in the United States any defense article to an 
embassy, any agency or subdivision of a foreign 
government (e.g., diplomatic missions); or 
    (4) Disclosing (including oral or visual disclosure) or 
transferring technical data to a foreign person, whether in 
the United States or abroad (this would affect foreign 
students, scientists, and researchers admitted to the U.S. 
                                                 
29 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1) (2004). 
30 22 C.F.R. § 120.1 (2004). 
31 22 C.F.R. § 120.3 (2004). 
32 22 C.F.R. § 123.1 (2004). 
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by the State Department on the appropriate visa to pursue a 
particular course of study or research); or 
    (5) Performing a defense service on behalf of, or for the 
benefit of, a foreign person, whether in the United States or 
abroad.33 
 
As a general proposition, I will use the term “deemed export” to 
describe the situation where a foreign national on U.S. soil may be 
exposed to or have access in any manner to an export-controlled item or 
export-controlled information, as described at (4) above. 
A “Defense Article” is anything on the United States 
Munitions List (USML).34 The term includes technical data 
recorded or stored in any physical form, as well as models, 
mockups or other items that reveal technical data directly 
relating to items on the USML.35 
 
A “Defense Service” may consist of any of the following: 
(1) furnishing of assistance (including training) to foreign 
persons, whether in the United States or abroad in the 
design, development, engineering, manufacture, 
production, assembly, testing, repair, maintenance, 
modification, operation, demilitarization, destruction, 
processing or use of defense articles; (2) furnishing to 
foreign persons of any technical data controlled by the 
ITAR, whether in the United States or abroad; or (3) 
military training of foreign units and forces, regular and 
irregular, including formal or informal instruction of 
foreign persons in the United States or abroad or by 
correspondence courses, technical, educational, or 
information publications and media of all kinds, training 
aids, orientation, training exercise, and military advice.36 
 
It is noteworthy that the training activity described by item (3) may 
involve utilization of information in the public domain. In fact, elsewhere 
                                                 
33 22 C.F.R. § 120.17 (2004) (emphasis added). 
34 22 C.F.R. § 120.6 (2004). 
35 Id. 
36 22 C.F.R. § 120.9 (2004) (emphasis added). 
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in the ITAR it is stated that the provision to a foreign national of even 
public domain information otherwise exempted from licensing 
requirements is designated a defense service requiring a license.37  
The term “Technical Data” means any of the following: 
(1) Information, other than software (defined elsewhere), 
which is required for the design, development, production, 
manufacture, assembly, operation, repair, testing, 
maintenance or modification of defense articles (this 
includes blueprints, drawings, photographs, plans, 
instructions and documentation); 
(2) Classified information relating to defense articles and 
defense services; 
(3) Information covered by an invention secrecy order; or 
(4) Software directly related to defense articles. 
ITAR expressly excludes from this definition 
information concerning general scientific, mathematical 
or engineering principles commonly taught in schools, 
colleges and universities, information in the public 
domain, and basic marketing information on function or 
purpose or general system descriptions of defense articles.38 
 
“Public Domain” is the term used to describe information 
which is published and which is generally accessible or 
available to the public through a variety of familiar means: 
(1) Through sales at newsstands and bookstores; 
(2) Through subscriptions which are available without 
restriction to any individual who desires to obtain or 
purchase the published information; 
(3) Through second class mailing privileges granted by the 
U.S. Government; 
(4) At libraries open to the public or from which the public 
can obtain documents; 
(5) Through patents available at any patent office; 
(6) Through unlimited distribution at a conference, 
meeting, seminar, trade show or exhibition, generally 
accessible to the public, in the United States; 
(7) Through public release (i.e., unlimited distribution) in 
                                                 
37 22 C.F.R. § 124.1(a) (2004). 
38 22 C.F.R. § 120.10(5) (2004) (emphasis added). 
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any form after approval by the cognizant U.S. government 
department or agency;39 
 
(8) Through fundamental research in science and 
engineering at accredited institutions of higher learning 
in the U.S. where the resulting information is ordinarily 
published and shared broadly in the scientific 
community. In keeping with NSDD 189, Fundamental 
Research is defined as basic and applied research in 
science and engineering where the resulting information 
is ordinarily published and shared broadly within the 
scientific community.40  University research will not be 
considered fundamental research if the University or its 
researchers accept restrictions on publication of scientific 
and technical information resulting from the project or 
activity, or the research is funded by the U.S. Government 
and specific access and dissemination controls are 
applicable to the information resulting from the research.41 
 
“Spacecraft Systems and Associated Equipment” in ITAR 
includes scientific, research, and experimental satellites.42  
These are deemed Significant Military Equipment (SME) if 
intended for use by foreign armed services (SME is a 
designation which may make anything subject to special 
restrictions based on substantial military utility or 
capability).43  Finally, the term “Associated Equipment”44 
encompasses a wide variety of items (such as mechanical 
adapters and interface hardware commercially available in 
the private sector), test equipment used in other arenas, 
ground control elements, tracking systems, Global 
                                                 
39 For example, specifications and other technical information concerning fabrication of 
Delta-series rockets had, until just recently, been available on a publicly accessible 
website, having previously been approved for release by the Secretary of the Air Force. 
Those websites have been dismantled, but you can get a flavor of what they once were by 
clicking on http://antwrp.gsfc.nasa.gov/apod/ap951213.html and 
http://www.universetoday.com/html/topics/delta.html. 
40 22 C.F.R. § 120.11 (2004) (emphasis added). 
41 Id. 
42 22 C.F.R. § 121.1, XV (2004) (emphasis added). 
43 Id. 
44 22 C.F.R. § 121.1, XV(e) (2004). 
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Positioning Systems, and any scientific or research 
“payload.”45 
 
“Registration” with the Department of State, Office of 
Defense Trade Controls, is required for any person (a 
natural person, corporation, business association, 
partnership, society, trust, organization, group, 
governmental entity, or any other group46) who either 
manufactures or exports defense articles or defense 
services. Registration is a prerequisite to the issuance of an 
export license, or other approval or authorization.47 
However, persons who engage only in the fabrication of 
articles for experimental or scientific purpose, including 
research and development, are not required to so 
register.48 
 
                                                 
45 22 C.F.R. § 121.1, XV(e) (2004). The State Department has amended the ITAR with 
regard to Spacecraft Systems and Associated Equipment fabricated only for fundamental 
research purposes and which involve research, experimental, and scientific satellites also 
appearing on the Munitions List (International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 67 Fed. Reg. 
15,099-15,101 (Mar. 29, 2002)). The State Department noted in its discussion of the Final 
Rule that it was State Department policy to not regulate fundamental research and that the 
“…the March transfer of commercial communications satellites to the USML did not 
change this policy.” None of this language appears in the Final Rule itself. Moreover, the 
new exemptions of general applicability provided by the Final Rule (22 C.F.R. section 
123.16(b)(10) and section 125.4(d)(1)) are limited to public domain information, which is 
not subject to ITAR controls in the first place. 
46 22 C.F.R. § 120.14 (2004). 
47 22 C.F.R. § 122.1 (2004).  
48 Id. (emphasis added). 
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Licenses49 are required for the export of technical data and 
classified and unclassified defense articles50 and defense services,51 unless 
                                                 
49 Licenses for the Export of Defense Articles. 22 C.F.R. § 123.1 (2004). 
(a) Any person who intends to export or to import temporarily a defense article must 
obtain the approval of the Office of Defense Trade Controls prior to the export or 
temporary import, unless the export or temporary import qualifies for an exemption under 
the provisions of this subchapter. Applications for export or temporary import must be 
made as follows: 
(1) Applications for licenses for permanent export must be made on Form DSP-5 
(unclassified); 
(2) Applications for licenses for temporary export must be made on Form DSP-73 
(unclassified); 
(3) Applications for licenses for temporary import must be made on Form DSP-61 
(unclassified); and 
(4) Applications for the export or temporary import of classified defense articles or 
classified technical data must be made on Form DSP-85. 
(b) Applications for Department of State export licenses must be confined to proposed 
exports of defense articles including technical data. 
(c) As a condition to the issuance of a license or other approval, the Office of Defense 
Trade Controls may require all pertinent documentary information regarding the 
proposed transaction and proper completion of the application form as follows: 
(1) Form DSP-5, DSP-61, DSP-73, and DSP-85 applications must have an entry in each 
block where space is provided for an entry. All requested information must be provided. 
(2) Attachments and supporting technical data or brochures should be submitted in seven 
collated copies. Two copies of any freight forwarder lists must be submitted. If the 
request is limited to renewal of a previous license or for the export of spare parts, only 
two sets of any attachment (including freight forwarder lists) and one copy of the 
previous license should be submitted. 
(3) A certification letter signed by an empowered official must accompany all application 
submissions (see Sec. 126.13 of this subchapter). 
(4) An application for a license under this part for the permanent export of defense 
articles sold commercially must be accompanied by a copy of a purchase order, letter of 
intent or other appropriate documentation. In cases involving the U.S. Foreign Military 
Sales program, three copies of the relevant Department of Defense Form 1513 are 
required, unless the procedures of Sec. 126.4(c) or Sec. 126.6 of this subchapter are 
followed. 
(5) Form DSP-83, duly executed, must accompany all license applications for the 
permanent export of significant military equipment, including classified hardware or 
classified technical data (see Secs. 123.10 and 125.3 of this subchapter). 
(6) A statement concerning the payment of political contributions, fees and commissions 
must accompany a permanent export application if the export involves defense articles or 
defense services valued in an amount of $500,000 or more and is being sold 
commercially to or for the use of the armed forces of a foreign country or international 
organization (see part 130 of this subchapter). 
(d) Provisions for furnishing the type of defense services described in Sec. 120.9(a) of 
this subchapter are contained in part 124 of this subchapter. Provisions for the export or 
temporary import of technical data and classified defense articles are contained in part 
125 of this subchapter. 
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the export is of public domain information.52 A license is also required for 
a disclosure, on U.S. soil, of technical data to any person or entity that is 
not a lawful permanent resident or a protected individual.53  The 
requirement applies to oral, visual, or documentary disclosure, regardless 
of the manner in which the information is transmitted. The provision to a 
foreign national of even public domain information otherwise 
exempted from licensing requirements is a defense service requiring a 
license.54  The licensing provisions of the ITAR also state that the 
“exemptions of general applicability” otherwise available do not 
extend to applied research.55 
Early in 2002, the State Department amended the ITAR with 
regard to Spacecraft Systems and Associated Equipment fabricated only 
for fundamental research purposes – but which involve research, 
experimental, and scientific satellites also appearing on the Munitions 
List.56  The State Department noted that, as a matter of policy, it did not 
regulate fundamental research and that the “…the March transfer of 
commercial communications satellites to the USML did not change this 
policy.” However, none of this language appears in the Final Rule itself. 
Moreover, the new exemptions of general applicability provided by the 
Final Rule (22 C.F.R. section 123.16(b)(10) and section 125.4(d)(1)) are 
limited to public domain information, which by definition is not subject to 
ITAR controls in the first place.57 
 
                                                                                                                         
50 22 C.F.R. § 125.1 (2004). 
51 22 C.F.R. pt. 124 (2004). 
52 22 C.F.R. pt. 125 (2004). 
53 22 C.F.R. §§ 125.2(c), 120.16 (2004). 
54 22 C.F.R. § 124.1(a) (2004) (emphasis added). 
55 22 C.F.R. § 125.4(c)(3) (2004) (emphasis added). 
56 67 Fed. Reg. 15,099 (Mar. 29, 2002) (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. pts. 123, 125). 
57 22 C.F.R. § 120.10(a)(5) (2004). 
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II. THE QUANDARY 
Anyone reading the ITAR will be understandably perplexed and 
confused by the conflicting, vague, and ambiguous provisions encountered 
therein, especially when attempting to align the regulations with the 
concept of fundamental research. 
As an express statement of national policy, NSDD 189 accords 
special treatment to the conduct of basic and applied research in science 
and engineering, the results of which are in the public domain, in the form 
of relief from many of the deemed export restrictions that might otherwise 
apply.  This is done in order to facilitate niversity-based international 
collaborations, among other things. Furthermore, according to the 
authorizing statute58 and the ITAR’s statement of purpose,59 anything that 
is to be added to the USML should not have preponderant civilian use or 
civilian performance equivalence. 
In addition to confounding a national policy and its own statement 
of purpose with regard to university-based satellite-reliant or –related 
fundamental research, ITAR’s scattered and various provisions on the 
same subject are contradictory. ITAR purports to have no jurisdiction over 
information in the public domain.60  ITAR also states that technical data 
for ITAR purposes does not include “information concerning general 
scientific, mathematical, or engineering principles commonly taught in 
schools, colleges, and universities or information in the public 
domain…”61  Those who fabricate an article for a scientific or 
experimental purpose need not register with the State Department (a 
precursor to licensing). Yet nonmilitary satellites appear to be subject to 
ITAR’s licensing and nondisclosure requirements by virtue of their recent 
                                                 
58 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2004). 
59 22 C.F.R. § 120.3 (2004). 
60 22 C.F.R. § 120.10(a)(5) (2004). 
61 Id. 
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inclusion on the USML. These satellites, information about which has 
been in the public domain for decades, are intended to carry (and have 
historically carried) university space-based research payloads and do not 
meet the “defense article” criteria. Yet providing even public domain 
information about space-based research to a foreign student presumably 
might land the discloser in jail as the unlicensed provision of a defense 
service.62 
The ambiguous treatment of fundamental research creates quite a 
quandary for those involved in university-based unclassified aeronautics 
and astronautics programs, as well as in courses in the fields of electrical 
engineering, computing, optics, and mechanical engineering, which deal 
with principles and applications that are not classified or secret. Those 
involved in university-based spacecraft-related research or teaching are 
not able to determine, no matter how carefully they parse the ITAR, 
whether their activities are subject to ITAR restrictions that will affect 
who may participate in those courses or have access to that research. 
Although beyond the scope of this article, it should be noted the 
decision to transfer back to the State Department jurisdiction over the 
export of satellites and related equipment and services has had an adverse 
effect on the US satellite (and related) industry.63 Within months of that 
enactment, that industry lost almost half of its market due to export 
licensing issues, and many of those needing such services have since 
turned to satellite and launch providers in Europe and elsewhere, which 
are advancing their technologies and market share free of such constraints. 
This causes a further question to arise: Did the transfer of preponderantly 
                                                 
62 See 22 C.F.R. pt. 127 (2004). 
63 Final Report of the Comm’n on the Future of the U.S. Aerospace Industry, at 
http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/aerospace/aerospacecommission/aerospacecommission.htm 
(Nov. 2002). 
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civilian use satellites to the USML remove a threat or create a 
vulnerability? 
 
A. PUBLIC DOMAIN SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGE IS 
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED SPEECH 
 
A seminal question is whether public domain “scientific speech” is 
protected by the Freedom of Speech guarantees of the First Amendment. 
There is little case law directly on the subject of public domain scientific 
information,64 but an affirmative answer to this question appears in a 
memo issued by the Justice Department in the late 1970s, in the context of 
publishing publicly available information about encryption.65 
In 1977, public key cryptography was virtually unknown outside of 
the National Security Administration and academia. When an NSA 
employee opined that academic publication of an article on that subject 
would violate export control laws, the Justice Department, Office of Legal 
Counsel (OLC), issued a series of opinions on the issue. 
The first of these, known as the “Harmon Memo,” concluded that 
"the regulatory provisions present questions of overbreadth and 
vagueness,", and that "[t]he ITAR requirement of a license as a 
prerequisite to 'exports' of cryptographic information clearly raises First 
Amendment questions of prior restraint."66 The Harmon memo found that 
dissemination restrictions on this admittedly publicly available 
                                                 
64 The Supreme Court has not decided whether scientific speech is so protected, but the 
factors it discussed in Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 
U.S. 748, 770 (1976) have been pointed to by commentators as suggesting such 
protection would be available.  See also Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); 
Richard Delgado & David R. Millen, God, Galileo and Government: Toward 
Constitutional Protection of Scientific Inquiry, 53 WASH. L. REV. 349 (1978). 
65 OLC Memorandum to Dr. Frank Press (May 11, 1978), reprinted in The Government’s 
Classification of Private Ideas: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on 
Gov’t Operations, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 268 (1980) [hereinafter Harmon Memo]. 
66 Harmon Memo, supra note 60, at 5. 
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information would be "justifiable under the First Amendment only to the 
extent that the information is properly classified or classifiable."67  It 
concluded "that the present ITAR licensing scheme does not meet 
constitutional standards."68 
Following revision of the ITAR in December of 1980,69 OLC 
issued its second series of opinions on the constitutionality of the ITAR 
regime.70  The 1981 opinion stated that "if speech is arguably protected by 
the First Amendment, it may not be subjected to prior restraint except in 
the most extraordinary cases" and that "[p]rior restraint . . . is 
presumptively unconstitutional."71  Because it did not "impose on the 
government the burden of obtaining prompt judicial review of any State 
Department decision barring the communication of cryptographic 
information," the OLC concluded that a requirement that a license be 
obtained before publication was an impermissible prior restraint.72 
No revision of the ITAR to address the issues raised in the OLC 
memos has occurred. The Justice Department, even though it revisited the 
issues in 1984 to review them light of later decisions, has neither retracted 
this memo nor recanted its substance. This, combined with the known 
related cases discussed herein73 supports the position that (hitherto) 
                                                 
67 Id. at 7. 
68 Id. at 11. 
69 Revision of the Traffic in Arms Regulation, 45 Fed. Reg. 83,970 (Dec. 19, 1980). 
70 Constitutionality of the Proposed Revision of the International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations, 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 202 (1981). 
71 Id. at 212. 
72 Id. at 205 (the present regulations still do not require the government to initiate a 
prompt judicial review of the denial of an export license for cryptographic data). 
73 First Amendment protection is not limited to political speech – as the following 
sections demonstrate, scientific speech may be a form of self expression as well as the 
means of exposition of ideas contributing to social and political developments. See also 
Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999), reh’g granted en banc and opinion withdrawn, 192 F.3d 
1308 (9th Cir. 2000); Roger Funk, Comment, National Security Controls on the 
Dissemination of Privately Generated Scientific Information, 30 UCLA L. REV. 405 
(1982). 
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publicly available scientific information related to university-based work 
involving experimental, research, and scientific satellites (and associated 
equipment, related systems, and scientific payloads) is a form of protected 
speech. 
 
B. THE ITAR IS VAGUE AND OVERBROAD IN VIOLATION 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS 
 
1. VAGUENESS 
Under American law, statutes and regulations must clearly define 
their terms and proscriptions, to ensure that people “of ordinary 
intelligence will have a reasonable opportunity to know what is 
prohibited.”74 Consequently, they are to be written clearly, without 
ambiguity, and free of internal inconsistencies, because a law with such 
defects fails to give warning to those who wish to act lawfully. A vague 
law is therefore objectionable on that basis alone.75  However, vaguely 
written regulations are additionally objectionable because they permit 
arbitrary and discriminatory application.76 
A vague law or regulation touching on first amendment rights is 
particularly pernicious as it inhibits the exercise of those rights by 
rendering uncertain what expression is permissible.77  Greater clarity is 
required of laws affecting first amendment interests.78 
a. Clear, Unambiguous, Consistent 
Scientific communication of public domain information clearly 
should enjoy First Amendment protection79 and the ITAR exemption for 
                                                 
74 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 108-09. 
77 Id. at 109. 
78 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 77 (1976). 
79 Notwithstanding the preeminence of political expression with regard to affording First 
Amendment protection, such protection is not limited to political speech – scientific 
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public domain information would seem to be aimed at this concern.80 
(Whether dissemination of space-based or satellite-related fundamental 
research poses a compelling or substantial threat to national security 
sufficient to justify the imposition of disclosure restrictions is discussed 
elsewhere in this article; see “Licensing Controls on Fundamental 
Research Constitute an Unconstitutional ‘Prior Restraint’). However, the 
ITAR’s treatment of public domain information is inconsistent, and in 
particular founders with regard to what may be considered a “defense 
service.” 
“Fundamental Research” is comprised of basic and applied 
research in science and engineering, the results of which are placed in the 
public domain.81 This concept is similar to the exemption for “general 
scientific, mathematical or engineering principles” commonly taught in 
schools and universities.82  The definition of ITAR-controlled technical 
data also excludes information in the public domain. But tucked away in 
ITAR Part 124, “Agreements, Off-Shore Procurement, and Other Defense 
Services,” is the following statement: 
“The requirements of this section apply whether or not 
technical data is to be disclosed or used in the performance 
of the services described in 120.9(a) of this subchapter 
                                                                                                                         
speech may be a form of self-expression as well as the means of exposition of ideas 
contributing to social and political developments. See infra notes 65-68. See also 
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Bernstein v. U.S. Department 
of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999), reh’g granted en banc and opinion withdrawn, 
192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 2000); Roger Funk, Comment, National Security Controls on the 
Dissemination of Privately Generated Scientific Information, 30 UCLA L. REV. 405 
(1982). 
80 Indeed, executive branch agencies funding fundamental research generally require that 
the research be published promptly and with wide dissemination. See, e.g., The Nat’l 
Science Foundation, National Science Foundation Grant General Conditions (GC-1), p. 
17 (July 1, 2002); Nat’l Institutes of Health, NIH Grants Policy Statement (Rev. 03/01), 
U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, p. 122 (Mar. 2001); Office of Naval Research, 
Educational Institutions, Nonprofit Institutions, and For-Profit Organizations: Research 
Grant Terms and Conditions, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, p. 6 (July 2001). 
81 22 C.F.R. § 120.11(a)(8) (2004). 
82 22 C.F.R. § 120.10(a)(5) (2004). 
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(e.g., all the information relied upon by the U.S. person in 
performing the defense service is in the public domain or is 
otherwise exempt from the licensing requirements of this 
subchapter pursuant to 125.4 [exemptions of general 
applicability] of this subchapter).”83 
 
Thus, it appears that one may also be deemed to provide a defense 
service by innocently engaging in certain transactions other than the 
explicit “training” of foreign nationals in military skills or use of defense 
articles. Under this rubric, merely providing a foreign person with public 
domain information could qualify as providing a defense service. 
Many research universities have aero-astro departments and teach 
courses in a wide variety of related disciplines. Universities also undertake 
research carried out in earth-orbit or outer space, which requires the 
development of scientific equipment to detect and record information in 
that extreme environment. This research equipment must be affixed to 
(and become the payload in) the satellite that will be its platform in space, 
a satellite with a preponderant civilian use. Both these types of university-
based endeavors constitute basic and applied research in science and 
engineering, the conduct and results of which are in the public domain. In 
both types of space-related activity, the interdisciplinary synergy produces 
vibrant research, which expands knowledge in many fields. This research 
naturally generates an abundance of scientific and technical papers, which 
are presented at conferences, published in the appropriate journals, and 
widely disseminated within the interested academic and scientific 
communities. 
This kind of publicly conducted research would appear to fall 
squarely within the exceptions to licensing found at 22 CFR 120.11 (2), 
                                                 
83 22 C.F.R. § 124.1(a) (2004). 
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(3), (6) and (8). It would also appear to be a form of protected speech.84 
Certainly anyone taking to heart the language of NSDD 189, or the 
fundamental research exemption found at 22 CFR 120.11(8) for “basic 
and applied research in science and engineering,” would believe that, for 
example, a new silicon wafer particle detector that they had been 
developed to conduct space-based research would be an advance they 
were free to discuss with their peers everywhere. 
Indeed, publications involving these disciplines necessarily contain 
information about spacecraft and associated equipment and scientific 
payloads. It is often the case that openly conducted research, especially 
where collaboration is involved, will be the subject of daily postings to 
more-or-less public websites. That same information will become part of 
the curriculum and thus also constitutes “general scientific, mathematical 
or engineering principles” commonly taught in schools and universities. 
Given the conflict between the ITAR definition of fundamental research as 
encompassing “applied research in science and engineering”85 and the 
ITAR statement elsewhere that its exemptions from licensing do not apply 
to “applied research,”86 are new research devices or technological 
advances that may have relevance to spacecraft actually defense articles? 
Would a disclosure about the new application be a “defense service” or 
“technical assistance” as per 22 CFR 124.1(a) if there is an international 
cohort among one’s students? Would the conduct of an international 
                                                 
84 See, e.g., Bernstein v. United States Dep’t of State, 945 F. Supp. 1279 (N.D. Cal. 1996) 
(“Cryptographic algorithms and theory are often published in scientific journals. … 
however, cryptographic algorithms are also covered by … the USML. Given these two 
facts, it would be hard for scientists to discern when their work was a defense article and 
when it was exempt from the ITAR … In fields of applied science, what is commonly 
taught in universities may well overlap with what the government might choose to 
regulate. In this instance, the deterrent effect on expression appears both real and 
substantial (citations omitted).”). 
85 22 C.F.R. § 120.11(a)(8) (2004). 
86 22 C.F.R. § 125.4(c)(3) (2004). 
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collaboration to develop and emplace a new space telescope (which is, 
after all, a remote sensing device) violate the provision that says a 
foreigner may not be given access to public domain information unless 
one first obtains a license?87 Is this the case even though the device has a 
preponderant civilian use? 
Even highly knowledgeable and experienced people, and certainly 
those of us of ordinary intelligence, would have enormous difficulty 
determining what behavior or speech would be prohibited or permitted 
after reading the ITAR. Consequently, they will be uncertain as to what 
speech is subject to regulation. The resulting anxiety will have a chilling 
effect, inhibiting such speech – especially if the penalty for certain 
violations of the ITAR can be imprisonment as well as a fine.88 
This chilling effect has already caused academicians to reconsider 
whether to engage in informal scientific exchanges with their international 
colleagues, whether and how to engage their foreign students in research 
projects, and whether to present papers at conferences where there may be 
an international audience (almost any conference will have such a make-
up). Foreign academic researchers reportedly have been denied access to 
fundamental research at U.S. universities due to fears that it might be 
subject to ITAR disclosure restrictions, and some American researchers 
were uncertain as to whether they needed to obtain a license from the State 
Department for potential conversations, discussions, meetings or other 
                                                 
87 Obtaining a license is a tortured, prolonged, and difficult process, and if granted, the 
license will generally be shot through with restrictions based on nationality, country of 
origin, ethnicity, or citizenship. Persons from certain countries, although they have been 
given a visa to study or research here, based on a State Department process that requires 
the government processor to know exactly what is going to be studied or researched and 
where, may still be excluded from an export license pertaining to that very activity 
pursuant to ITAR. With regard to international collaborations, the ever-shifting cast of 
participants makes the timely obtaining of a license almost impossible. Finally, once 
registered with the Department of State for licensing purposes, an entity may lose all 
ability to invoke the fundamental research exclusion for its work thereafter. 
88 22 C.F.R. § 120.27 (2004) and 22 C.F.R. pt. 127 (2004). 
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informal scientific exchanges with foreign colleagues about fundamental 
research that might arguably (someday, maybe) have a defense-related 
potential.89 
This has not been the limit of the impact. As recently noted in the 
journal “IEEE Spectrum Online” by Eugene B. Skolnikoff, Professor 
Emeritus at MIT: 
“ITAR has hurt the U.S. satellite industry, mainly through 
lost markets share. It has also battered the academic space-
science community. Proposed projects have been delayed; 
some talented non-U.S. scientists have decided not to try to 
work with their counterparts in the United States; non-U.S. 
graduate students in U.S. universities have been excluded 
from some scientific meetings related to their projects; 
discussions at some international scientific meetings have 
been constrained or aborted; and university-industry 
collaborations have been disrupted.”90 
 
The internal inconsistencies just described render the ITAR 
impermissibly vague and ineluctably uncertain as to the applicability of 
the law with regard to space-based or satellite-reliant fundamental 
research carried out as U.S. universities. 
 
b. Arbitrary Application 
                                                 
89 Association of American Universities, ITAR and Universities: Universities are 
Educational Institutions, Not Munitions Manufacturers, at 
http://www.aau.edu/sheets/ITAR.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 2004); The State Department 
issued “clarification” in the spring of 2003 (International Traffic in Arms Regulations: 
Exemptions for U.S. Institutions of Higher Education, 60 Fed. Reg. 15,099-15,101 (Mar. 
29,2003)). State reiterated that it was State Department policy to not regulate 
fundamental research and that the “…the March transfer of commercial communications 
satellites to the USML did not change this policy.” However, this language does not 
appear in the so-called clarifying regulations, and the new exemptions of general 
applicability provided by the Final Rule (22 C.F.R. § 123.16(b)(10) (2003) and § 
125.4(d)(1) (2003)) are limited to public domain information, which nominally is not 
subject to ITAR control in the first place. 
90 Eugene B. Skolnikoff, Security and Sanity, IEEE SPECTRUM, April 2003, at 14. 
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As noted at the outset of this section, vaguely written regulations 
are additionally flawed because they permit arbitrary and discriminatory 
application. Moreover, the resulting arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement is in violation of the due process requirements of our 
constitution, because one cannot know with any confidence what activity 
is prohibited. The regulations are not clear to those being regulated, and 
they are no more clear to those doing the regulating. 
Because of the lack of consistent, clear guiding principles, a 
regulator has complete discretion to establish the degree of protection that 
he or she may feel is appropriate. Many appear to assume that, in any 
dialog that occurs between a U.S. person and a foreign person, the U.S. 
person has superior knowledge that must be safeguarded. Under this 
scenario, consider whether a U.S. student, employed as a lab assistant to a 
visiting Ph.D. physics professor from abroad, should be required to obtain 
a license to provide a “defense service,” in spite of the fact that she would 
be performing trivial duties associated with carrying out public domain 
fundamental research (and advancing her academic career by working) 
with the foreign physicist. 
The vagueness of the regulations makes the regulators unsure, and 
this uncertainty is an incentive to err on the side of conservatism. 
Understandably, in the current environment,a regulator is likely to be 
entirely concerned about failing to prevent the nefarious exploitation of 
our information and technology and thus require a license regardless of 
what the ITAR may permit. It is anecdotally reported that this concern, 
placed in the vague and twisting maze of the ITAR and bereft of 
instruction as to constitutional constraints, has led to rulings that defective 
foreign components cannot be returned to their country of origin for repair 
without an export license from the State Department. 
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Similarly, approval for a transfer of an on-orbit satellite (that is, 
one already placed in earth orbit), to provide communications services to 
India languished for a year at the State Department, even though the 
satellite was French built (rendering the issue of technology transfer 
moot), reportedly because it contained some U.S. components – which had 
already been vetted for release pursuant to the license that approved sale 
of the components to the French in the first place.91 
2. OVERBREADTH  
A law is overbroad if it reaches a substantial amount of 
constitutionally protected conduct in attempting to restrain legitimately 
prohibited activity.92  Where the enactment “unquestionably attaches 
sanctions to protected conduct, the likelihood that the statute will deter 
that conduct is ordinarily sufficiently great to justify an overbreadth 
attack.”93  In 1984, just as the ITAR reissued, the Justice Department 
revisited the Harmon Memo to consider two intervening Supreme Court 
decisions, Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) and Bolger 
v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983); it concluded that the 
revised ITAR would still "appear to us to present sensitive constitutional 
issues" and that there was still an unconstitutional "remaining 
overbreadth."94 
                                                 
91 For an interesting discussion of other examples, see Alice P. Gast, Mass. Inst. Tech., 
The Impact of Restricting Information Access on Science and Technology, at 
http://www.aau.edu/research/Gast.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 2003) and Genevieve J. Knezo, 
Sensitive but Unclassified’ and Other Federal Security Controls on Scientific and 
Technical Information: History and Current Controversy, Congressional Research 
Service, The Library of Congress, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RL31845.pdf 
(last modified July 2, 2003). 
92 Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982). 
93 Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 801 
n.19 (1984) (citing Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 207 (1975)). 
94 Office of the Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Memorandum for Davis R. Robinson 
Legal Adviser [sic] Department of State at Section IV, at 
http://www.eff.org/Activism/FOIA/ITAR_FOIA/simms_robinson.memo (Jul. 5, 1985). 
Related letters that are similarly interesting reading may be found at 
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The ITAR, at 22 CFR 124.1(a), specifically states that the giving to 
a foreign national of even public domain information otherwise exempted 
from licensing is a defense service requiring a license. Assuming, as we 
have been, that publicly available scientific information that constitutes 
fundamental research is protected speech, and given that a violation of the 
ITAR can result in both criminal and civil penalties,95 then the licensing 
requirement is likely to deter speech containing information about 
fundamental research in the aero-astro field generally or any research 
taking place in outer space. Such an outcome fairly compels the 
conclusion that, with regard to public domain information pertaining to 
space-based or satellite-related research, the ITAR is overbroad and 
constitutes in application a denial of due process. 
 
C. LICENSING CONTROLS ON FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH 
CONSTITUTE AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL “PRIOR RESTRAINT” 
 
As acknowledged earlier in this discussion, some scientific 
communication may be so embedded in a legitimately regulated 
transaction that such speech itself may be restricted “as a necessary 
incident” to regulating the export of munitions.96 Even fully protected 
speech may be disclosure restricted as a compelling threat to national 
                                                                                                                         
http://www.eff.org/Activism/FOIA/ITAR_FOIA/olson_mcconnell.letter and 
http://www.eff.org/Activism/FOIA/ITAR_FOIA/mcconnell_garn.letter. 
95 22 C.F.R. pt. 127 (2004). 
96 United States v. Edler Indus., Inc., 579 F.2d 516, 520 (9th Cir. 1978). 
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security if its disclosure would result in a danger that is immediate97 and 
certain.98 
For purposes of this discussion, the question of whether the 
expression of scientific information derived from fundamental research 
qualifies as protected speech is answered in the affirmative.99  Although 
there is a dearth of cases on this point,100 the issue of disclosure of 
scientific information is not a new one and much has been written about 
the subject over the years.101  Notwithstanding the preeminence of 
political expression with regard to affording First Amendment 
protection,102 such protection is not limited to political speech. For 
example, the First Amendment protects the rights of union members to 
                                                 
97 See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726-27 (1971), (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (stating that a threat to national security will not justify “even the issuance of 
an interim restraining order” unless the threat will “inevitably, directly, and immediately 
cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at 
sea.”). See also id. at 730, (Stewart & White, JJ. Concurring) (stating that the threat must 
result in “direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to the nation.”). 
98 See id. at 726-27. 
99 The constitutional infirmities which the Justice Department repeatedly identified in the 
ITAR remain there today. There is still no provision for prompt judicial review, at the 
government's instigation, of decisions to prohibit dissemination of cryptographic 
information outside the United States. See 8 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 7,8 (1984). 
100 See generally Bernstein v. Dep’t of State, 945 F. Supp. 1279 (N.D. Cal. 1996) 
(discussing protected scientific speech). See also Bernstein v. United States Dep’t of 
Justice, 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999) (discussing public domain information, speech, 
and export controls), Reh’g granted en banc and opinion withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th 
Cir. 1999). 
101 See generally National Academy of Sciences, Report for the Department of State – 
Science and Foreign Relations, U.S. Dep’t of State, Washington, D.C. (1950); Edward 
Teller, Secrecy: The Road to Nowhere, TECH. REV., October 1981, at 12; Committee on 
Science, Engineering, and Public Policy (U.S.) – Panel on Scientific Communication and 
National Security, Scientific Communication and National Security: A Report, National 
Academy Press, Washington, D.C. (1982); Association of American Universities, ITAR 
and Universities: Universities Are Educational Institutions, Not Munitions 
Manufacturers, at http://www.aau.edu/sheets/ITAR.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 2004); Shiela 
Widnall, In the Public Interest: Report of the MIT Ad Hoc Faculty Committee on Access 
to and Disclosure of Scientific Information, at 
http://web.mit.edu/faculty/reports/publicinterest.pdf (June 12, 2002); Charles M. Vest, 
Response and Responsibility: Balancing Security and Openness in Research and 
Education, at http://web.mit.edu/president/communications/rpt01-02.html (last visited 
Jan. 10, 2004). 
102 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
                     Vol. 2 [2003]               SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 31  
                                                        www.scu.edu/scjil 
 
associate for the purpose of discussing the hiring of an attorney,103 an act 
that is merely a management decision not intended to advance a political 
or social agenda. That scientific speech may constitute self-expression and 
the exposition of ideas contributing to the general social good has been 
discussed most recently in the Bernstein case,104 but it has also been a 
subject of legal discussion for decades.105  Assuming scientific expression 
is protected speech, and that fundamental research (public domain) 
discussions constitute scientific expression, this inquiry turns directly to 
the question of whether dissemination of fundamental research that is 
space-based or satellite-related poses a compelling threat to national 
security, sufficient to overcome its protected status. 
1. An Immediate and Certain Danger Sufficient to Permit 
Restriction on Otherwise Protected Speech? 
 
We are concerned here with basically two types of spacecraft-
related information: first, that which is owned (and was generated by) a 
private party or entity and needed by a university researcher to 
successfully seat an experiment in a satellite provided by the third party (a 
vendor’s “interface information”), and second, that which derives from the 
diligent application of general principles of mathematics, science, and 
engineering in aeronautical and astronautical disciplines in a U.S. 
institution of higher education (“university-generated information”). 
An earlier commentator opined that scientific information poses an 
immediate threat if it meets three criteria: 1) the time from its receipt by a 
foreign power to its actual application is short as measured on an 
appropriate time scale of technological development; 2) it has identifiable 
                                                 
103 See United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967). 
104 Bernstein v. Dep’t of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999), reh’g granted en banc 
and opinion withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999). 
105 See generally James R. Ferguson, Scientific and Technological Expression: A Problem 
in First Amendment Theory, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 519, 533-43 (1981) (discussing, 
among other things, the political value of free scientific expression). 
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direct military uses or related production applicability; and 3) it would 
give the enemy an identifiable, material military advantage over the 
United States.106 He also proposed the additional condition that the United 
States be the exclusive source of the information (on the basis that it 
would be pointless to suppress information available in other countries).107  
Given the reasonableness and utility of this approach, it is adopted here. 
With these criteria in mind, consider this: Design and 
manufacturing information about the satellites and rockets generally used 
by universities to provide a platform for their spacebased research had 
been in the public domain for a considerable amount of time before such 
data was suddenly declared disclosure restricted by the State Department. 
Moreover, when utilizing these “workhorse” spacecraft, the interface 
between the scientific apparatus and the satellite in which it will be seated 
is limited largely to the interface area alone. Recall much of this interface 
information had previously been a matter of public knowledge, along with 
information about heat, vibration, and radiation hardening requirements 
(also known as “shake and bake” data).108 
a. Interface Information 
With regard to space-based research projects that require only a 
relatively simple means to reach and maintain a location in space, the 
disclosure to university researchers,collaborators and students of the 
interface layer and the requisite “shake and bake” information, seems 
unlikely to result in any danger. These satellites have had a preponderant 
civilian application, never were intended to serve a military purpose, and 
                                                 
106 Roger Funk, Comment, National Security Controls on the Dissemination of Privately 
Generated Scientific Information, 30 UCLA L. REV. 405 (1982). 
107 Id. 
108 ITAR limits those to whom this interface information may be disclosed, which means 
that foreign collaborators or students who design and develop the very scientific 
apparatus that is to carry out the research may not be told important fabrication details. 22 
C.F.R. § 125.4(b)(10) (2004). 
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have well-known (public) specifications as a result of prior disclosure. 
Being able to visually access the interface area of such a transport vehicle 
would not result in the identification by the observer of direct military uses 
and would not provide the observer’s military with a specific military 
advantage. Even if all the interface information were made immediately 
available to a foreign military, an immediate threat would not result; one 
cannot reverseengineer a satellite, even an “old technology” satellite, from 
this interface information. Additionally, this type of information is readily 
available from commercial foreign sources. Therefore, a vendor’s 
unrestricted provision of satellite interface information to a university’s 
researchers, as an aid in their fabrication of an experimental apparatus, 
would not pose a compelling threat to national security. 
 
 
b. University-Generated Information 
University aero-astro departments and the ancillary programs in 
departments of mechanical engineering, optics, and electrical engineering, 
have steadily provided innovation after innovation. The Global 
Positioning System is but one example of university-based fundamental 
research giving rise to a useful technology, one with clear civilian 
applications and performance equivalence as well as military utility. Often 
military applications derive from a new technology that came from initial 
civilian application and purpose. This type of research is openly conducted 
and is comprised of “basic and applied research in science and 
engineering” of the type vouchsafed by NSDD 189. That is, it is to 
proceed largely unfettered by deemed export constraints, precisely in order 
to facilitate the bringing of the best available minds to bear on any 
problem. It is worthwhile to repeat that policy here, a policy which 
expressly took into account the possibility that United States’ enemies 
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might obtain some advantage by participating in our universities or their 
products and which concluded that the benefits outweighed the risk: 
It is the policy of this Administration that, to the maximum 
extent possible, the products of fundamental research 
remain unrestricted. It is also the policy of this 
Administration that, where the national security requires 
control, the mechanism for control of information 
generated during federally funded fundamental research in 
science, technology and engineering at colleges, 
universities and laboratories is classification. Each federal 
government agency is responsible for: a) determining 
whether classification is appropriate prior to the award of a 
research grant, contract, or cooperative agreement and, if 
so, controlling the research results through standard 
classification procedures; b) periodically reviewing all 
research grants, contracts or cooperative agreements for 
potential classification. No restriction may be placed upon 
the conduct or reporting of federally funded fundament 
research that has not received national security 
classification, except as provided in applicable U.S. 
Statutes.109 
 
In other words, the President and the National Security Council 
determined, at the height of the cold war, thoughtfully and with 
deliberation, that keeping fundamental research in the public domain did 
not pose a compelling threat to national security. 
On that basis, one may confidently assert that university-generated 
spacecraft-related fundamental research does not present an immediate 
and certain danger. And it must be clear that the U.S. is not the only 
country in the world with universities that engage in, and whose 
researchers have the full complement of knowledge about, spacecraft and 
associated systems.110 Therefore, the expression of scientific information 
                                                 
109 National Security Decision Directive 189, supra note 1. 
110 In this regard, it may be warranted to recall that terrorist impacts such as that 
experienced on Sept. 11, 2001 in the United States were neither reliant on high 
technology nor satellite-related. 
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about fundamental research in spacecraft constitutes protected speech that 
does not pose a national security threat of such status as to warrant 
imposition of disclosure restrictions. 
2. Appropriate Disclosure Restrictions, or Impermissible Prior 
Restraint? 
 
We now turn to the issue of whether such public domain scientific 
exchange is impermissibly subjected to prior restraint by virtue of the 
ITAR controls that may appear to apply to that speech. 
a. License Prerequisite to Protected Speech 
While the bulk of the ITAR scheme is aimed not at expression but 
at containment of defense-related commodities, a licensing requirement 
that would apply to disclosure of even public domain information is 
clearly likely to capture a particular type of protected expression: scientific 
exchange in the realm of fundamental research conducted openly within a 
university context. Prior restraint may be found when the restriction has a 
“close enough nexus to expression, or to conduct commonly associated 
with expression, to pose a real and substantial threat of identified 
censorship risks.”111 A regulation requiring that a license be obtained 
before one may discuss public domain information with a foreign person 
in the US, as does the ITAR at 124.1(a), would seem to demonstrate 
exactly that relationship between speech and censorship and thus 
constitutes a prior restraint. 
The Supreme Court has consistently held that any prior restraint on 
expression “comes to this Court with a ’heavy presumption’ against its 
constitutional validity.”112 Justice Brennan, in the Pentagon Papers case, 
concluded that the First Amendment’s ban on prior restraints could only 
                                                 
111 City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 759 (1988). 
112 Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (citing Carroll v. Princess 
Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181 (1968) and Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 
(1963)). 
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be overridden in times of war and even then, according to Justice Stewart, 
only when disclosure would “surely result in direct, immediate, and 
irreparable damage to our nation or its people.”113  While national security 
is and should be accorded a great deal of deference and some speech may 
be properly restricted when it is “a necessary incident” to the controlling 
the export of weapons,114 the mere brandishing of the term “national 
security” without more is too amorphous a rationale to abrogate the 
protections of the First Amendment.115 
Consequently, at a minimum, any attempt to license, censor or 
restrain protected speech must satisfy a series of procedural and 
substantive requirements.  
 
b. A Lack of Procedural Safeguards 
If a licensing scheme controlling the export of speech or public 
domain publication (a prior restraint) does not employ sufficient 
procedural safeguards, it must be invalidated. The licensing scheme would 
be invalid, not because it is necessarily content based, but because it 
bestows on a government official too much discretionary power to 
procedurally hinder or even prevent expression by virtue of multiple or 
periodic licensing requirements.116 
For a licensing requirement on the export of speech to be 
constitutional, it must be subject to three procedural safeguards: 1) a 
specific and reasonable time is set for the making of a licensing decision, 
                                                 
113 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 at 726, 730 (1971). 
114 United States v. Edler Indus., Inc., 579 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1978). 
115 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. at 719. 
116 Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. at 760. 
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2) provision is made for prompt judicial review, and 3) the censor bears 
the burden of going to court and justifying a licensing denial.117 
The Arms Export Control Act excludes from the Administrative 
Procedures Act the functions to be implemented in the ITAR.118 There is 
no limit to the time in which the Office of Defense Trade Controls 
(ODTC) must make a licensing decision. The ITAR does not provide for 
judicial review of licensing decisions, and the initial designation of items 
as defense articles is not reviewable. Because there is no such recourse, 
there is no burden on ODTC to justify any denial. 
Thus, The ITAR scheme fails on every count. As it pertains to 
expression concerning space-based or satellite-related fundamental 
research, it constitutes an impermissible prior restraint on protected 
speech. 
III. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
Openness in fundamental research is a critical element of most 
universities’ teaching and research mission (certainly a hallmark of those, 
like Stanford University, which are not engaged in any classified 
research). Integral to openness, and just as critical, is participation by an 
international array of faculty, students, and collaborators. Those with 
comparable education, experience, and skills earned abroad bring their 
accomplishments and intellectual capital to U.S. academies in order to 
further their studies or the studies of our students. The result is an 
exchange of ideas and concepts among peers of equal intellectual strength; 
these ideas and concepts are challenged, scrutinized, encouraged, 
criticized and honed. As recently stated by Bernard Bailyn, albeit in a 
                                                 
117 FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215. 227-28 (1990) (citing Freedman v. 
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-60 (1965)). 
118 22 U.S.C. §§ 2752, 2778, 2780, 2792, 2797. “Because the exercising of the foreign 
affairs function, including the decisions required to implement the Arms Export Control 
Act, is highly discretionary, it is excluded from review under the Administrative 
Procedure Act.” 22 C.F.R. § 128.1 (2004). 
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somewhat different context, “. . .most often the creative imagination does 
not flare in isolation. Creative minds stimulate each other, interaction and 
competition have a generative effect, sparks fly from disagreement and 
rivalry, and entire groups become creative.”119 Nowhere is this more 
apparent than in mathematics, the hard sciences, engineering, and related 
disciplines. No price can be placed upon the value of such an environment. 
It is possible that the protections afforded protected speech by the 
national policy covering fundamental research may not prevail and that the 
dissemination and participation restrictions of a "deemed export" may be 
brought to bear on the disciplines mentioned. If so, a cascade of adverse 
effects may flow. If important courses are consequently eliminated, for 
example, and class sizes and research projects diminish due to restrictions 
on participation by foreigners, then U.S. students may choose to go 
abroad, where they can obtain the full complement of courses in their 
disciplines. Their foreign peers, unable to complete their studies or fully 
participate in research here, may remain abroad. Moreover, if a university 
accedes to ITAR’s disclosure restrictions for its space-based or satellite-
reliant/related research, it may find that thereafter ALL its research is 
subject to such controls. Why? Because ITAR provides that the 
acceptance of dissemination, participation, and access restrictions on 
research may destroy entirely the "fundamental research" character of the 
work – it is as yet unknown whether this “taint” would result in ITAR 
application in areas not satellite-related.120 
As has been asked elsewhere: 
[D]oes secrecy actually begin to erode national security 
when it chokes off the exchange of information that enables 
                                                 
119 BERNARD BAILYN, TO BEGIN THE WORLD ANEW: THE GENIUS AND AMBIGUITIES OF 
THE AMERICAN FOUNDERS 3 (2003). 
120 22 C.F.R. § 120.11(8)(ii). Government imposition of access and dissemination 
controls destroys the “fundamental research” character of the endeavor. 
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a vital research community to thrive and innovate. … 
Under ITAR, even discussing information about controlled 
technology with a non-U.S. citizen is a crime punishable by 
imprisonment or steep fines. And, strangely, it doesn’t 
matter if the information has already been published and is 
freely available on the Internet.… In countless 
technologies, from nuclear bombs to encryption software, 
the genie is out of the bottle. It is flitting around the 
Internet and lurking on the shelves of science libraries all 
over the world. Uncertain times call for prudent 
restrictions. But pretending that violent extremists and the 
enemies of progress and freedom cannot read or use the 
Internet might very will harm the security we are striving to 
maintain.121 
 
Perhaps of gravest concern is the potential for further 
diminishment of our academies’ ability to produce U.S. graduates in 
rocketry, satellite technology, and similar fields that draw upon 
mathematics, the hard sciences, and engineering. The best and brightest 
American minds in any discipline reliant on space-based research (for 
example, aeronautics, astrophysics, and environmental and biological 
sciences related to space exploration) may end up developing and 
contributing their research talents elsewhere. Thus, there will be far fewer 
of these talented U.S. citizens in domestic academies to engage in 
federally funded research, which may ultimately have adverse 
consequences for national security interests. 
In concluding, I would like to again quote Dr. Skolnikoff: 
[O]f course, restrictions on publication or sharing of 
information are sometimes necessary. When they are, they 
must be designed intelligently and in consultation with the 
affected industry and universities. They must have a clear 
and realistic purpose, and be formulated in the realization 
that the nation, and its technical and scientific 
establishments, have been incredibly well served by 
maintaining open channels of communication. We must not 
                                                 
121 Secret Enough for You?, IEEE SPECTRUM, April 2003, at 9. 
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lose sight of the fact that the strength of science and 
technology in the United States is one of its greatest assets 
in the fight against terrorism.122 
                                                 
122 Eugene B. Skolnikoff, Security and Sanity, IEEE SPECTRUM, April 2003, at 14. 
